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Abstract 
This paper puts the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset to a formal econometric testing to see 
whether public debt has a negative nonlinear effect on growth if public debt exceeds 
90% of GDP. Using nonlinear threshold models, we show that the negative nonlinear 
relationship between debt and growth is very sensitive to modelling choices. We also 
show that when nonlinearity is detected, the negative nonlinear effect kicks in at much 
lower levels of public debt (between 20% and 60% of GDP). These results, based on 
bivariate regressions on secular time series, are confirmed on a shorter dataset 
(1960-2010) using a multivariate growth framework. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis prompted by the unwinding US subprime mortgage market 
resulted in deep economic recession in many countries of the world. Governments and central 
banks reacted to the Great Recession by firing heavy artillery: fiscal and monetary policy 
expansion, unprecedented in size and in the way they were co-ordinated across countries, were 
swiftly enacted in advanced and emerging markets, and banking sector bailouts prevented the 
collapse of the financial system. While these actions certainly helped smooth the cycle, 
discretionary fiscal loosening and banking sector bail-outs contributed to a large extent to a sharp 
increase in many countries’ public debt-to-GDP ratio. It is against this background that Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010) pointed out the existence of strong negative effects of high public debt on 
economic growth. Using simple descriptive statistics, they demonstrated forcefully that economic 
growth slows down considerably if the public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90%. 
There are a number of channels through which public debt is likely to hamper long-term 
growth. First, tax hikes needed to service a higher public debt crowd out private investment by 
reducing disposable income and saving, raise the distortionary costs of taxation, and are likely to 
result in non-neutral tax treatment within and across asset classes, thus amplifying distortions. 
Second, soaring public debt will push up long-term sovereign yields in a nonlinear fashion, as the 
likelihood of default increases. High long-term rates crowd out productive public investment, and, 
more importantly, reduce private investment by increasing the cost of capital. Reduced investment 
in R&D will have long-lasting negative impacts on growth (Elmeskov and Sutherland, 2012). 
Third, public authorities, especially in countries with weak institutions, may decide to inflate 
away debt, and high inflation has a notoriously detrimental effect on growth (Kumar and 
Woo, 2010). 
Many recent empirical papers sought to pin down and explain the possibly nonlinear negative 
relationship between public debt and growth. Most of these papers broadly confirm that the 
turning point beyond which economic growth slows down sharply is around 90% of GDP. 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) find a threshold of 86% of GDP for a panel of 18 OECD countries and for 
the period from 1980 to 2010. Padoan et al. (2012) report similar effects for a similar group of 
countries but a longer period (1960 to 2010). Covering a mix of advanced and emerging market 
economies, Kumar and Woo (2010) finds a turning point at 90% of GDP. Checherita and 
Rother (2010) and Baum et al. (2012) report similar results for a set of euro area countries. But 
2 
 
  
Caner et al. (2010) and Elmeskov and Sutherland (2012) show that the tipping point is probably 
lower: 77% for a set of 77 countries, and 66% for a dozen of OECD countries, respectively. 
Finally, in a recent contribution, Panizza and Presbitero (2012) argue that a negative correlation 
between debt and growth does not imply causality, as lower growth can result in a higher public 
debt to GDP ratio. 
This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by putting a variant of the Reinhart-Rogoff 
dataset to a formal econometric testing by first using the thresholds proposed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) and then identifying the thresholds endogenously on the basis of the testing 
procedure proposed by Hansen (1999) for the period 1790 to 2009 and 1946 to 2009. We then 
embed the growth-debt relationship in a general multivariate growth framework and combine it 
with Bayesian model averaging to gauge the impact of model uncertainty on the presence of 
threshold effects for 1960 to 2010. 
We find some evidence in favour of a negative nonlinear relationship between debt and 
growth. But these results are very sensitive to the time dimension and country coverage 
considered, data frequency (annual data vs. multi-year averages) and assumptions on the 
minimum number of observations required in each nonlinear regime. We also show that nonlinear 
effects are likely to kick in at much lower levels of public debt (between 20% and 60% of GDP). 
These results, based on bivariate regressions on secular time series, are largely confirmed on a 
shorter dataset (1960-2010) when using a multivariate growth framework that accounts for 
traditional drivers of long-term economic growth and model uncertainty. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some stylised facts about the public 
debt-growth nexus by focusing on the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset. Section 3 presents empirical 
results for the variant of the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset. Section 4 embeds the debt-growth 
relationship in a multivariate growth framework and provides results using Bayesian model 
averaging. Finally, section 5 summarises and provides some policy implications. 
2. Stylised facts 
In their influential paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) rely on descriptive statistics to show 
that public debt as a share of GDP may have a detrimental effect on the rate of growth of real 
GDP. More specifically, they argue that the crucial public debt-to-GDP ratio is 90%, beyond 
which growth slows down considerably. Their charts and tables are meant to prove this claim: 
average and median annual GDP growth rates are shown relative to the level of the central 
government debt-to-GDP ratio for the period from 1946 to 2009. For a group of selected advanced 
countries, average GDP growth drops from around 3% to below 2% as public debt passes the 
threshold of 90% of GDP. The fall is more dramatic if growth is measured in terms of the median, 
rather than the average: a public debt-to-GDP ratio higher than 90% is associated with zero GDP 
growth. A similar pattern can be observed if only data for the US are considered: public debt 
exceeding the threshold of 90% goes in tandem with a decline in annual growth from about 3.5% 
to well below zero. The drop is again more pronounced if the median and not the average growth 
rate is looked at. The conclusion is strikingly similar for a group of selected emerging market 
economies, for which growth slows down by an annual 2 percentage points when public debt 
moves from below to above 90% of GDP. Figure 1 below reproduces these results for the group 
of advanced and emerging market economies. 
Figure 1. Annual real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP, 1946-2009 
Results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Developed countries         Emerging market economies 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). 
While Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) do not provide the data used in their paper, the data on 
central government debt can be obtained from the data appendix of another paper of the same 
authors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Real GDP growth rates are available for a number of 
countries for the same time period from the Barro-Ursúa macroeconomic dataset (Barro and 
Ursúa, 2011). Putting these two datasets together enables us to broadly replicate the the Reinhart 
and Rogoff data coverage on selected advanced economies. But there are some differences. First, 
our data excludes Ireland and includes Switzerland. Second, the emerging market country 
coverage of our data differs substantially from theirs. We have data on GDP growth for 16 out of 
the 24 countries included in their empirical investigation. But we also have data for five additional 
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developing countries. Finally, and importantly, our series often start considerably earlier. This 
gives us more observations for the full sample period, whereas our coverage is almost identical for 
the period 1946-2009. Table A1 in the appendix lists the differences. 
We use our dataset to replicate and extend the results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Figures 
hereafter show average and median real GDP growth as the central government debt-to-GDP ratio 
varies for our entire sample, the group of advanced economies and two groups of emerging 
markets, the first including the 16 countries covered in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and the second 
containing all emerging countries for which data are available. In addition to the whole sample 
(1790-2009) and the post-war period (1946-2009), we also show numbers for the period from 
1790 to 1939. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2, which shows GDP growth along rises in 
public debt as a share of GDP. First, for all countries and for the group of developed countries, 
growth remains broadly stable as public debt increase from the range of 60% to 90% of GDP to 
above 90%. This suggests the absence of any sudden change (fall) in growth rates beyond 90% of 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio. As a matter of fact, for these two samples, growth rates appear to 
decline gradually with the rise in public debt from the range 0% to 30% to above 90%. Growth 
even seems to increase slightly once the debt ratio is above 90% for some periods. Second, for the 
period 1946-2009, growth slows down for the two groups of emerging market economies as 
public debt moves from the range of 60% to 90% to beyond 90% of GDP. But GDP growth rates 
associated with debt levels above 90% are higher than when debt varies between 30% and 60% of 
GDP. Finally, contrary to Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), some of these observations are not very 
sensitive to the alternative use of the median of annual growth rates and the average growth rate. 
The difference only matters for emerging markets and for the whole and the pre-war periods 
(1790-2009 and 1790-1939): for the group of emerging markets, higher debt goes in tandem with 
a increase in the median growth rate (Panel C and D of Figure 2). 
  
Figure 2. Annual real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP 
 1790-2009 1790-1939 1946-2009 
Panel A. Developed and emerging market economies (41 countries) 
 
Panel B. Developed economies (20 countries) 
 
Panel C. Emerging market economies – 16 countries 
 
Panel D. Emerging market economies – 21 countries 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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We carry out a sensitivity analysis to see the extent to which the average growth rates are 
subject to the influence of individual countries. Jackknifing the sample of the selected advanced 
economies (that is recalculating the average growth rates by omitting one country at a time) 
indicates that the average for the whole advanced economy sample is not influenced by outlier 
countries if the debt ratio is below 90%. But the uncertainty is relatively large when debt is higher 
than 90% of GDP: the gap between the minimum and maximum of the average growth rate is one 
percentage point for the entire sample period (1790-2009) and half a percentage point for the two 
sub-periods (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Annual real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP sensitivity analysis 
Developed economies, minimum, maximum and average 
1790-2009 1790-1939 1946-2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Another way of having a preliminary idea about the correlation between growth and debt is to 
plot the annual GDP growth rates against the debt ratio. The scatter plots presented in Figure 4 are 
striking: GDP growth and the public debt ratio do not appear to have any relationship with one 
another for any of the country groups and sub-periods considered. The general picture does not 
change if public debt is plotted with a lag of one year (Figure A1 in the appendix). 
Multi-year averages eliminate cyclical and other short-term effects, which may contaminate 
the scatter plots of annual figures. Therefore, Figure 4b plots non-overlapping 5-, 8- and 10-year 
averages for growth and public debt for the period 1946-2009. Yet eyeball econometrics does not 
suggest an apparent negative correlation between debt and growth, especially for the full sample 
and the group of emerging market economies. Using debt with a one period lag confirms these 
observations (Figure A2 in the appendix). 
Figure 4a. Annual real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP 
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Panel B. Developed economies 
    1790-2009       1790-1939       1946-2009 
 
Panel C. Emerging market economies – 21 economies 
    1790-2009       1790-1939       1946-2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Figure 4b. Non-overlapping multi-year real GDP growth and central government debt as a % of GDP, 1946-2009 
Panel A. Developed and emerging market economies 
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Panel B. Developed economies 
   5-year averages       8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Panel C. Emerging market economies – 21 economies 
   5-year averages       8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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3. A formal test of nonlinearity 
Econometric issues 
We apply a multi-step approach to our secular dataset covering the period from 1790 to 2009 
to formally analyse the link between public debt and growth. We first start by looking at the 
bivariate linear relationship by estimating the following regression for growth and debt:  ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                  (1) 
where ∆𝑦 is annual real GDP growth and debt stands for the central government debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Equation (1) is estimated for a pooled panel and with country fixed effects. 
We then estimate threshold models, in which the effect of debt on growth depends on the 
level of debt. In these models, the thresholds put forth by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) are 
imposed. A two-regime model is estimated where the coefficient on public debt can be different 
below and above the threshold of 90% of the debt ratio. We also estimate a three-regime model, in 
which the three regimes are separated by the 60% and 90% debt thresholds. Finally, a four-regime 
model account for all 3 thresholds proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff: 30%, 60% and 90% of 
central government debt. This four-regime model can be written as follows:  







≥++
<≤++
<≤++
<++
=∆
%90
%90%60
%60%30
%30
44
33
22
11
DEBTifDEBT
DEBTifDEBT
DEBTifDEBT
DEBTifDEBT
y
tt
tt
tt
tt
t
εβα
εβα
εβα
εβα
 (2)
 
A shortcoming of this approach is that the choice of the number of the regimes and the value 
of the thresholds are necessarily arbitrary and we do not know whether any of the nonlinear 
models provides a better fit for the underlying data than alternative linear and nonlinear 
specifications. The testing procedure developed by Hansen (1999) helps solve these problems 
because it first determines the threshold values endogenously through a grid search, and second, it 
tests the different models sequentially against one another using bootstrapping methods. The 
linear specification is tested against a two-regime model. If the null hypothesis of the linear model 
can be rejected against the alternative of a two-regime model, the null of a two-regime model is 
tested against the alternative of a three-regime model. The two-regime and three-regime models 
can be written as follows. 



≥+⋅+
<+⋅+
=∆
TDEBTifDEBT
TDEBTifDEBT
y
tt
tt
t εβα
εβα
22
11
 (3a)
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

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 (3b)
 
T is the value of the threshold of debt in the two-regime model and T1 and T2 are the lower 
and upper threshold values of debt in the three-regime model. A grid search with steps of 1% of 
the distribution is carried out to find the value of the threshold variable (public debt) that 
minimises the sum of squared residuals of the estimated two-regime model. The grid search starts 
at 20% of the distribution and stops at 80% to ensure that a sufficient number of observations falls 
into each regime.  
The three-regime model is estimated based on two threshold values of the threshold variable 
that minimise the sum of squared residuals across the estimated models. The threshold from the 
two-regime model is held fixed and a grid search is used to identify the second threshold. We 
impose the restriction that the two thresholds should be separated at least by 20% of our sample 
observations. Once the second threshold is identified, a backward grid search is performed to 
identify the first threshold as suggested by Hansen (1999).  
We can proceed with the sequential testing of the models, once the thresholds are identified. 
Hansen (1999) shows that the null hypothesis of 21 ββ =  from equations (3a) can be tested using 
a likelihood ratio test. Given that the likelihood ratio test statistic does not follow a standard 
asymptotic distribution as the threshold value is not identified under the null hypothesis, the 
distribution of the test statistic is obtained through bootstrapping with random draws with 
replacement. The bootstrap test was carried out using N=500 replications. If the likelihood ratio 
test statistic rejects the null hypothesis of the linear model against the two-regime model (on the 
basis of the bootstrapped critical values), whether there are three different regimes rather than 
only two regimes is also analysed. The bootstrap procedure described above is applied to the 
two-regime and three-regime models.  
Estimation results 
Simple bivariate panel regressions yield a negative link between growth and public debt. The 
coefficient is always negative but its size is not particularly large in economic terms: a 
10 percentage increase in the public debt ratio is associated with 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point lower 
economic growth. In addition, the statistical significance of this result varies very much across 
different country samples and time periods. Results tend to be statistically significant for the 
whole period and for the post-war period but not for 1790 to 1939. The result is also sensitive to 
country coverage: for the two sub-periods (1790-1939 and 1946-2010), the estimate is not 
significant for the smaller sample of emerging markets but it is when five countries are added to 
the sample (Table 1).  
As for the nonlinear specifications estimated using threshold values taken from Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010), the results again show some instability. The estimated coefficients are not 
significant at the 10% level for 1790-1939 for the samples including all countries and the 
advanced countries only and for 1946-2009 for the smaller group of emerging countries.  
While the estimated coefficients of the public debt ratio variable is almost always negative 
for 1790-2009 and 1946-2009, indicating that higher debt relates to slower growth, the size of the 
coefficients decreases by a factor of 2 to 5 as the debt ratio rises. This could imply that the 
harmful effect of public debt on growth diminishes with rising debt, but it could also well be the 
case that lower coefficients indicate that a one percentage point increase in the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio means a lower rate of growth of debt for higher levels of debt. We re-run the 
equations using the rate of growth rather than the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio as independent 
(nonlinear) variable2. For the two- and three-regime models, it indeed seems to be the case that 
the negative coefficients of the growth rate of debt increases with a rise of the level of debt. But 
for the 4-regime models, the negative coefficient for debt ranging from 60% to 90% of GDP is 
lower if debt is lower than 60% or higher than 90% (Table 1).  
 
2. But we still use the debt-to-GDP ratio as the threshold variable. 
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Table 1. The nonlinear relation between public debt and growth, 1790-2009, annual data 
EXOGENOUSLY IMPOSED DEBT THRESHOLDS (30%, 60%, 90% of government debt) 
 
ALL COUNTRIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 16 EMERGING COUNTRIES 21 EMERGING COUNTRIES 
 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
Nonlinear variable = central government debt as a % of GDP 
Linear model -0.009 ** -0.001  -0.022 ** -0.006 * 0.003  -0.020 ** -0.019 ** -0.021 
 
-0.023 ** -0.017 ** -0.015 
 
-0.026 ** 
2-regime model             
               debt<90% -0.016 ** -0.001  -0.029 ** -0.013 ** 0.006  -0.030 ** -0.022 ** -0.019 
 
-0.025 ** -0.023 ** -0.018 
 
-0.029 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.009 ** -0.001  -0.021 ** -0.007 ** 0.003  -0.019 ** -0.018 ** -0.021 
 
-0.022 ** -0.016 ** -0.015 
 
-0.024 ** 
3-regime model             
                debt<=60% -0.016 ** 0.003  -0.035 ** -0.007  0.017  -0.038 ** -0.041 ** -0.065 ** -0.030 ** -0.035 ** -0.041 
 
-0.032 ** 
    60%<=debt <90% -0.016 ** 0.000  -0.029 ** -0.014 ** 0.005  -0.029 ** -0.022 ** -0.024 
 
-0.024 ** -0.023 ** -0.022 
 
-0.029 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.009 ** 0.000  -0.022 ** -0.006 * 0.004  -0.021 ** -0.021 ** -0.029 * -0.023 ** -0.018 ** -0.020 
 
-0.025 ** 
4-regime model             
                debt<30% -0.021  0.011  -0.057 ** 0.012  0.033  -0.019  -0.084 ** -0.105 * -0.082 ** -0.076 ** -0.069 
 
-0.096 ** 
    30%<=debt <60% -0.017 ** 0.004  -0.040 ** -0.003  0.019  -0.033 ** -0.051 ** -0.075 ** -0.042 ** -0.044 ** -0.048 
 
-0.046 ** 
    60%<=debt <90% -0.017 ** 0.001  -0.033 ** -0.011 * 0.007  -0.026 ** -0.030 ** -0.033 
 
-0.034 ** -0.030 ** -0.027 
 
-0.040 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.009 ** 0.000  -0.024 ** -0.004  0.005  -0.019 ** -0.027 ** -0.035 * -0.030 ** -0.023 ** -0.023 
 
-0.033 ** 
Nonlinear variable = rate of growth of central government debt as a % of GDP 
Linear model -0.009 ** -0.001  -0.022 ** -0.006 * 0.003  -0.020 ** -0.019 ** -0.021 
 
-0.023 ** -0.017 ** -0.015 
 
-0.026 ** 
2-regime model             
               debt<90% -0.011 ** -0.018 ** -0.009 ** -0.016 ** -0.014 ** -0.020  -0.010 ** -0.042 ** -0.008 ** -0.010 ** -0.029 ** -0.008 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.072 ** -0.069 * -0.083 ** -0.041  -0.023  -0.216 ** -0.099 ** -0.118 ** -0.080 ** -0.093 ** -0.117 ** -0.074 ** 
3-regime model             
                debt<=60% -0.011 ** -0.018 ** -0.008 ** -0.019 ** -0.013 ** -0.054 ** -0.009 ** -0.056 ** -0.007 ** -0.009 ** -0.033 ** -0.007 ** 
    60%<=debt <90% -0.016  -0.018  -0.016  -0.007  -0.023  -0.002  -0.040 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.077 ** -0.041 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.071 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.072 ** -0.069 * -0.083 ** -0.041  -0.023  -0.219 ** -0.099 ** -0.119 ** -0.080 ** -0.093 ** -0.117 ** -0.075 ** 
4-regime model             
                debt<30% -0.008 ** -0.014 ** -0.006 ** -0.013 ** -0.010 ** -0.046 ** -0.007 ** -0.069 ** -0.005 ** -0.007 ** -0.056 ** -0.006 ** 
    30%<=debt <60% -0.045 ** -0.033 ** -0.061 ** -0.074 ** -0.098 ** -0.072 ** -0.054 ** -0.041 ** -0.062 ** -0.035 ** -0.021 * -0.057 ** 
    60%<=debt <90% -0.016  -0.018  -0.016  -0.008  -0.023  -0.002  -0.040 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.077 ** -0.041 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.071 ** 
    debt>=90% -0.072 ** -0.069 * -0.084 ** -0.041  -0.023  -0.219 ** -0.100 ** -0.118 ** -0.082 ** -0.093 ** -0.117 ** -0.076 ** 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects.  
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 A serious problem with the correlation between public debt and growth is that any change in the 
growth rate of real GDP will have a mechanical effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, we re-estimate 
the nonlinear specifications using the lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio. Indeed, the previous results can be 
confirmed only for two sub-samples: for all countries from 1946 to 2009 and for the advanced country 
group from 1946 to 2009. The statistically significant negative nonlinear relationship between debt and 
growth disappears for the other sub-samples (Table A2 in the appendix). Again, we check whether a 
decrease in the negative coefficients on the level of the debt-to-GDP ratio implies a declining or increasing 
negative impact as the level of debt rises. Astonishingly, the results show the absence of any negative 
correlation between the growth rate of debt and economic growth for debt levels exceeding 90% of GDP. 
The only exception is the group of advanced countries for 1946 to 2009. 
These disappointing results may be due to the fact that the choice of the debt thresholds is arbitrary. 
So it is natural to try to figure out the values of the thresholds in a data-driven approach. There is evidence 
for nonlinear effects both for the entire period (1790-2009) and for the post-war period (1946-2009) for the 
relation between growth and contemporaneous debt. The estimated negative coefficients tend to decrease 
for higher debt levels. But an important difference is that the debt thresholds are very low: slightly below 
20% of GDP for the sample encompassing all countries and slightly above 30% for the group of emerging 
markets. The thresholds picked in the three-regime model for advanced economies are also considerably 
lower than the 90% put forward by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010): the first threshold is about 30% and the 
second threshold is around 60% GDP (Table A3 in the appendix). 
But again, the evidence obtained for the debt ratio lagged one year is much less convincing. Table 2 
shows that while the estimated coefficients are negative for the high-debt regime for the entire sample and 
the developed country group (1790-2009), they are not statistically significant and their size is very small. 
For the same period, no nonlinearity could be detected for emerging market economies. When the time 
coverage is restricted to 1946 to 2009, the tests of nonlinearity show that the relation between debt and 
growth differs depending on the level of debt. For the advanced countries, a low level of debt is associated 
with a nontrivial positive effect of debt on growth and with a small negative impact above the debt 
threshold of 20% of GDP: a 10 percentage point rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio goes in tandem with 0.08 
percentage point decline in economic growth. For the other country groups, the coefficient estimates are 
statistically insignificant in the high-debt regime (Table 2). Results obtained using the growth rate of the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio are not much more reassuring. It is only for the period 1790 to 2009 and for 
developed countries that a high level of debt is associated with a lower growth performance (Table 3): a 
1% increase in the debt ratio goes hand in hand with an almost 0.4% drop in economic growth. Yet this 
result cannot be confirmed for the period 1946-2009 for which the null hypothesis of a linear specification 
cannot be rejected against the alternative of threshold nonlinearities (Table 3). 
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Using non-overlapping multi-year averages can potentially eliminate short-term noises from our data 
series. Results based on such data for advanced countries (1946-2009) are reported in Table 4. There is no 
empirical evidence for a negative nonlinear relation between debt and growth if we use 5-year averages. 
For 8-year averages, regressions based on the growth rate of debt indicate strong nonlinear effects 
(Table 4): there is no correlation between growth and debt if debt is roughly below 40% of GDP and a 
negative relationship above this threshold, which imply that a 1% increase in debt is associated with a 
0.1% decline in growth. For 10-year averages, the negative effect is even stronger above the threshold of 
67% of GDP: a 0.3% decline in growth. These findings are somewhat sensitive to how the threshold 
models are parameterised (the minimum number of observations required in each regime) but the overall 
conclusions remain unaltered (Table A5 in the appendix). 
Finally, we also investigate whether alternative forms of nonlinearity do a better job of describing the 
debt-growth relation. A polynomial trend of the debt variable (equation 4) would allow for instance a 
smooth transition around the turning point:      ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡               (4) 
Table 2. The nonlinear relationship between public debt and growth, annual data - Endogenous debt thresholds 
Nonlinear variable = lagged public debt; Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 
All 
countries 
Advanced 
countries 
16 Emerging 
countries 
21 Emerging 
countries 
1790-2009 
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.064  0.018  0.134  0.218  
H0: 2 regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.218  0.010  0.146  0.226  
Coefficients         
   Low debt 0.011  0.061 **     
   Middle debt -0.001  0.015 *     
   High debt   -0.001      
Debt thresholds (%)         
   Threshold 1 40.51  20.38      
   Threshold 2   55.35      
Country fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
No. obs 4700  2881  1634  1880  
1946-2009 
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2 regimes 0.012  0.000  0.060  0.050  
H0: 2 regimes vs. H1: 3 regimes 0.116  0.104  0.304  0.376  
Coefficients         
   Low debt 0.047 ** 0.063 ** -0.021  -0.032 * 
   Middle debt         
   High debt -0.004  -0.008 * 0.004  -0.002  
Debt thresholds (%)         
   Threshold 1 16.42  20.38  38.02  36.10  
Country fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  
No. obs 2220  1236  896  1037  
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 3. The nonlinear relationship between public debt and growth, annual data 
Endogenous debt thresholds 
Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth of public debt 
Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 
All 
countries 
Advance 
countries 
16 Emerging 
countries 
21 Emerging 
countries 
1790-2009 
Test of nonlinearity bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2 regimes 0.024  0.076  0.034  0.030  
H0: 2 regimes vs. H1: 3 regimes 0.030  0.338  0.054  0.036  
Coefficients         
   Low debt 0.000  -0.002  0.001  0.000  
   Middle debt -0.024 **   -0.026 ** -0.023 ** 
   High debt -0.004  -0.036 * 0.000  0.002  
Debt thresholds (%)         
   Threshold 1 28.90  73.73  17.45  17.39  
   Threshold 2 51.72    54.18  50.99  
1946-2009 
Test of nonlinearity bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2 regimes 0.004  0.104  0.000  0.004  
H0: 2 regimes vs. H1: 3 regimes 0.000  0.024  0.028  0.028  
Coefficients         
   Low debt -0.001    -0.001  -0.001  
   Middle debt -0.033 **   -0.045 ** -0.036 ** 
   High debt -0.002    -0.010  -0.007  
Debt thresholds (%)         
   Threshold 1 18.39    18.46  17.71  
   Threshold 2 60.83    50.57  53.84  
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Table 4. Advanced OECD countries, 1946-2009, non-overlapping multi-year averages 
 
Nonlinear variable = public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = public debt/GDP 
Nonlinear variable = growth rate of public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = public debt/GDP 
 5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 
5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 Test of nonlinearity bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2 regimes 0.004 
 
0.024 
 
0.004 
 
0.044 
 
0.018 
 
0.006 
 H0: 2 regimes vs. H1: 3 regimes 0.002 
 
0.106 
 
0.012 
 
0.086 
 
0.106 
 
0.134 
 Coefficients 
               Low debt 0.098 ** -0.034 ** 0.11 ** 0.018 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.068 ** 
   Middle debt 0.034 * 
  
0.031 
 
-0.064 ** 
       High debt -0.005 
 
-0.017 ** -0.01 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.095 ** -0.289 ** 
Debt thresholds (%) 
                Threshold 1 18.61 
 
58.17 
 
18.41 
 
17.47 
 
42.56 
 
67.04 
     Threshold 2 33.27 
   
36.30 
 
39.13 
     Country fixed effects YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 No. obs 238 
 
140 
 
140 
 
237 
 
139 
 
139 
 No. countries 20 
 
20 
 
20 
 
20 
 
20 
 
20 
 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. The nonlinear effect of public debt on growth 
Polynomial functional form of nonlinearity 
 
All 
 countries 
Advanced 
 countries 
16 Emerging 
 countries 
21 Emerging 
 countries 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 
1790-2009 -0.026** 0.00008** -0.027** 0.00009** -0.001 -0.00014 -0.013 -0.00003 
1790-1936 -0.015 0.00005 -0.014 0.00006 0.051 -0.00046** 0.014 -0.00016 
1946-2009 -0.070** 0.00038* -0.076** 0.00042* -0.044** 0.00017 -0.048** 0.00019 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝜀𝑡  
 
𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 𝛼 𝛽 
1790-2009 -0.011* 0.00004 -0.019** 0.00006* -0.010 0.00014 -0.003 0.00006 
1790-1936 0.013 -0.00002 0.005 0.00000 0.026 0.00000 0.026 -0.00003 
1946-2009 -0.025** 0.00011** -0.039** 0.00015** -0.032* 0.00037** -0.032* 0.00032** 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed 
effects.  
Ideally, a hump-shaped pattern of growth around the turning point such as plotted in Panel A of 
Figure 5 would be in line with a disruptive debt-growth relationship. Nevertheless, the estimation results, 
both for the contemporaneous and lagged level of debt, indicate that higher debt is accompanied by higher 
economic growth (Panel B of Figure 5). Not quite the results we were looking for. 
Figure 5. Polynomial functional form of nonlinearity 
 Panel A. Calibration         Panel B. Estimated parameters 
 
Note: Panel B uses the estimated parameters of the model ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡2 + 𝜀𝑡 reported in Table 55. The results are 
almost identical if the estimated parameters of the model based on lagged public debt is used. 
4. Accounting for other drivers of growth and model uncertainty 
Nonlinearity embedded in a model averaging framework 
We now embed the public debt-growth nexus into a general growth framework. In accordance with a 
general production function approach, the level of per capita GDP (rather than real GDP growth) is a 
function of human and physical capital and labour input. Formulating this long-run relationship in terms of 
an error correction model yields a model where the rate of growth of per capita GDP depends on lagged 
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 per capita level (𝑐𝑎𝑝−1) and lagged values of the other explanatory variables. Following the growth 
literature, physical capital can be proxied by the investment-to-GDP ratio (inv), human capital by average 
years of schooling (edu) and labour input by population growth (∆𝑝𝑜𝑝). Additional controls used in the 
literature are inflation (infl) and openness (open). 
Hansen’s threshold modelling framework can be applied to this set of covariants to analyse the 
possible nonlinear relationship between economic growth and debt: 
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where debt is general government debt and 𝑋� is a vector of independent variables. But a high number 
of independent variables poses the problem of model uncertainty. To address this issue, Bayesian 
averaging of classical estimates (BACE), which provides estimates for all possible combinations of the (K) 
candidate explanatory variables, is given by K2 3. The BACE technique shows whether the inclusion of a 
candidate variable improves the fit of the model (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). BACE determines the 
posterior probability attributed to each single model jM that includes the variable of interest and is 
conditioned on the underlying dataset ( )( yMP j ). 
∑
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−−
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i
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j
j
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SSETMP
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2
1
2/2/
2/2/
)(
)(
)(  (6) 
where SSE is the sum of squared residuals, T is the number of observations, k denotes the number of 
explanatory variables included in the specific model and K is the number of all explanatory variables 
considered. Expression (6) gives the contribution of a given model to explaining the dependent variable as 
3. Or some subset of models. If the number of models to be estimated is too large, techniques such as 
Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo, stochastic search variable selection, or random sampling are alternative 
approaches to estimating all possible models. Given the relatively low number of potential explanatory 
variables used here, we estimate all possible combinations. 
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compared to the other models. Expression (6) is then summed over the models that contain the variable of 
interest to obtain the posterior inclusion probability of this variable. If the posterior inclusion probability is 
higher than the prior inclusion probability, one can conclude that the candidate variable should be included 
in the estimated models.4  
The posterior mean and the square root of the variance (standard error) conditional on inclusion can 
be used to obtain t-statistics and to determine the significance of the individual variables upon inclusion. 
The posterior mean conditional on inclusion ( )( yE β ) is the average of the individual OLS estimates 
weighted by )( yMP j . As the unconditional posterior mean considers all regressions (even those without 
the variable of interest), the unconditional posterior mean of any given variable can be derived as the 
product of the conditional posterior mean and the posterior inclusion probability.  The posterior variance of 
β  ( )( yVar β ) can be calculated as follows:  
∑∑
==
−+=
KK
j
jjj
j
j yEyMPMyVaryMPyVar
2
1
2
2
1
))(ˆ)((),()()( ββββ  (7) 
The linear BACE approach can be extended to possible nonlinearities between growth and public debt 
by including equations (5a) and (5b) into the model space (Crespo-Cuaresma and Doppelhofer, 2007). In 
the spirit of model averaging, we estimate all possible combinations of the candidate explanatory variables. 
For each combination, the linear, two-regime and three-regime models are estimated. The selection 
between linear and nonlinear models is done by using Hansen’s (1999) bootstrapping method described 
earlier. An advantage of this methodology is that only a single linear or nonlinear model is selected for a 
given set of explanatory variables.  
Estimation results 
We assemble a dataset, drawn from the OECD’s Economic Outlook database, including 
non-overlapping multi-year (5-year, 8-year and 10-year) averages for 29 OECD countries covering the 
period 1960-2010. As the series start for a number of countries only in the 1970s and 1980s, we also define 
a narrow sample including only 13 OECD countries for which time series start in the 1960s. Figure 6 
below gives a flavour on the possible correlation between lagged general government debt and growth. The 
scatter plots do not show a clear cut negative relationship.  
  
4. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) compare the posterior inclusion probability to a prior inclusion probability for 
their 67 explanatory variables in 7 variable models. The prior inclusion probability is then 7/67=0.1044. 
 19 
                                                     
 Figure 6. Non-overlapping multi-year real GDP per capita growth (DCAPPNEWOK) and lagged general government debt 
(GGFLQ) as a % of GDP, 1960-2010, 29 OECD countries 
   5-year averages       8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Bayesian averaging of classical estimates augmented for nonlinearities helps us evaluate the 
uncertainty stemming from model specification. The estimation results suggest the presence of a strong 
negative nonlinear relation between lagged general government debt and growth. For the sample of 
29 OECD countries, the posterior inclusion probability is higher than 50% for the three-regime model for 
the 5-year, 8-year and 10-year averages (Table 4a). This indicates that the three-regime model prevails 
over the linear and two-regime models. But there is one exception: the debt variable, either in a linear 
specification or in a nonlinear fashion, is not included in the final model space for 8-year averages if each 
regime has to contain at least 10% of the observations. Results for the posterior mean conditional on 
inclusion exhibit a large amount of instability. The nature of nonlinearity differs depending on whether 5-, 
8- or 10-year averages are used. For 5-year averages, there is a negative relationship between growth and 
debt in all three regimes, but the largest negative effect occurs when public debt is the lowest. For 8-year 
averages, public debt and growth have a positive correlation if the debt-to-GDP ratio is roughly below 35% 
but the relation turns negative above this threshold. Finally, the correlation between debt and growth is 
very volatile for 10-year averages: the correlation can be negative or positive depending on how many 
observations are allowed in particular regimes (Table 4a). 
Turning now to the group of 13 OECD countries, Table 4b shows that whether the two- or the 
three-regime model is selected depends on the type of the multi-annual averages (5-, 8- and 10-year 
averages). The posterior mean is negative for 8-year averages and increases with higher public debt. For 
10-year averages, the negative relationship is the largest for the low-debt regime, which contradicts the 
Reinhart-Rogoff prediction. Finally, for 5-year averages, there is a positive relation between debt and 
growth if the debt–to-GDP ratio increases. Another strong contradiction with the Reinhart-Rogoff result is 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
_5_DCAPPPNEWOK
_5
_G
G
FL
Q
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
_8_DCAPPPNEWOK
_8
_G
G
FL
Q
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
_10_DCAPPPNEWOK
_1
0_
G
G
FL
Q
 20 
 ECO/WKP(2012)70 
that if there is a negative nonlinear link between debt and growth, they kick in at much lower debt levels: 
between 20% and 60% of GDP. The results are much shakier if we replace the level of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio by its growth rate. There is much less evidence for nonlinearity in this case, and a strong negative 
correlation emerges at higher levels of debt only for the group of 13 OECD countries and if 8-year 
averages are used (Tables 4c and 4d). 
 
Table 4a. Nonlinear model averaging – General government debt and growth, 29 OECD countries, 1960-2010 
Nonlinear variable = lagged public debt; Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 5-year averages 8-year averages 10-year averages 
 Minimum % of observations in one regime 
  10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 
Posterior inclusion probability 
Linear regime 0.009 0.016 0.052 0.071 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2-regimes 0.003 0.284 0.344 0.158 0.457 0.416 0.076 0.003 0.002 
3-regimes 0.790 0.700 0.605 0.077 0.541 0.583 0.911 0.997 0.998 
Posterior mean conditional on inclusion 
   Low debt -0.041 -0.017 -0.019 -- 0.010 0.008 -0.034 0.000 0.000 
   Middle debt -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 -- 0.031 0.029 -0.011 0.013 0.012 
   High debt -0.021 -0.008 -0.010 -- -0.014 -0.015 -0.021 0.066 0.065 
Debt thresholds (%) 
   Threshold 1 27.70 24.54 21.20 -- 23.21 25.00 36.95 42.14 41.93 
   Threshold 2 53.02 46.98 40.58 -- 34.02 36.63 64.53 70.64 70.72 
Note: Bold figures indicate that the estimated posterior inclusion probability is higher than 0.50. 
Table 4b. Nonlinear model averaging–- General government debt and growth, 13 OECD countries, 1960-2010 
Nonlinear variable = lagged public debt; Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 5-year averages 8-year averages 10-year averages 
 
 
 Minimum % of observations in one regime 
  10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 
Posterior inclusion probability 
Linear 0.000 0.227 0.227 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 
2-regimes 0.686 0.773 0.773 0.000 0.186 0.186 0.000 0.001 0.001 
3-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.839 0.807 0.807 0.999 0.998 0.997 
Posterior mean conditional on inclusion 
   Low debt -0.015 -0.022 -0.022 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 
   Middle debt    -0.005 0.034 0.033 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
   High debt -0.008 0.007 0.007 -0.013 -0.061 -0.061 -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 
Debt thresholds (%) 
   Threshold 1 42.69 49.73 49.73 37.48 35.42 35.44    
   Threshold 2    51.59 48.99 49.02 40.93 40.92 40.87 
Note: Bold figures indicate that the estimated posterior inclusion probability is higher than 0.50. 
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 Table 4c. Nonlinear model averaging – he rate of growth of general government debt and growth, 
29 OECD countries, 1960-2010  
Nonlinear variable = lagged growth rate of public debt 
Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 5-year averages 8-year averages 10-year averages 
 Minimum % of observations in one regime 
  10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 
Posterior inclusion probability 
Linear 0.888 0.315 0.315 0.950 0.114 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 regimes 0.000 0.232 0.232 0.000 0.478 0.478 0.988 0.943 0.987 
3 regimes 0.000 0.453 0.453 0.000 0.408 0.408 0.012 0.057 0.013 
Posterior mean conditional on inclusion 
   Low debt 0.034   0.038   0.031 0.030 0.031 
   Middle debt          
   High debt       0.150 0.143 0.150 
Debt thresholds (%) 
   Threshold 1       68.82 66.441 69.51 
   Threshold 2          
Note: Bold figures indicate that the estimated posterior inclusion probability is higher than 0.50. 
Table 4d. Nonlinear model averaging – The rate of growth of general government debt and growth, 
13 OECD countries, 1960-2010 
Nonlinear variable = lagged growth rate of public debt 
Threshold variable = lagged public debt 
 5-year averages 8-year averages 10-year averages 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
  10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30% 
Posterior inclusion probability 
Linear 0.000 0.035 0.035 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.015 0.134 0.189 
2-regimes 0.961 0.965 0.965 0.016 0.157 0.154 0.190 0.772 0.737 
3-regimes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.941 0.839 0.843 0.669 0.094 0.074 
Posterior mean conditional on inclusion 
   Low debt 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.026 0.025 0.049 
   Middle debt    0.071 0.042 0.043 0.057   
   High debt 0.080 0.079 0.079 -0.082 -0.070 -0.070 0.009 0.068 0.060 
Debt thresholds (%) 
   Threshold 1 42.05 43.14 43.14 40.49 36.62 36.76 27.42 53.51 45.86 
   Threshold 2    57.13 50.93 51.14 47.02   
Note: Bold figures indicate that the estimated posterior inclusion probability is higher than 0.50. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to contribute to the empirical literature on the debt threshold beyond which 
negative effects for economic growth appear. We put a variant of the Reinhart-Rogoff dataset to a formal 
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econometric test. Using nonlinear threshold models, we found some evidence in favour of a negative 
nonlinear relationship between debt and growth. But these results are very sensitive to the time dimension 
and country coverage considered, data frequency (annual data vs. multi-year averages) and assumptions on 
the minimum number of observations required in each nonlinear regime. We also showed that nonlinear 
effects can kick in at much lower levels of public debt (between 20% and 60% of GDP). These results, 
based on bivariate regressions on secular time series, are largely confirmed on a shorter dataset 
(1960-2010) when using a multivariate growth framework that accounts for traditional drivers of long-term 
economic growth and model uncertainty. 
Previous empirical papers, validating the Reinhart-Rogoff result of a 90% public debt ceiling beyond 
which economic growth slows significantly, called for debt reduction to improve long-term growth. The 
implications of our results are that 90% is not a magic number. The threshold can be lower and the 
nonlinearity can change across different samples and specifications. Nonlinear effects might be more 
complex and difficult to model than previously thought. Instability might be a result of nonlinear effects 
changing over time, across countries and economic conditions. Further research is certainly needed to fully 
understand the link between public debt and growth. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Data coverage: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) vs. the dataset used in the paper 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
Our dataset, which draws on 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) for the level of central government debt 
Barro and Ursúa (2012) for real GDP growth 
Developed countries 
Australia 1902-2009 1861-2009 
Austria 1880-2009 1880-2009 
Belgium 1835-2009 1847-2009 
Canada 1925-2009 1871-2009 
Denmark 1880-2009 1880-2009 
Finland  1913-2009 1914-2009 
France 1880-2009 1880-2009 
Germany 1880-2009 1880-2009 
Greece 1884-2009 1848-2009 
Ireland 1949-2009 -- 
Italy 1880-2009 1862-2009 
Japan 1885-2009 1872-2009 
Netherlands 1880-2009 1814-2009 
New Zealand 1932-2009 1831-2009 
Norway 1880-2009 1880-2009 
Portugal 1851-2009 1851-2009 
Spain 1850-2009 1850-2009 
Sweden 1880-2009 1801-2009 
Switzerland -- 1880-2009 
United Kingdom 1830-2009 1831-2009 
USA 1790-2009 1791-2009 
Emerging market economies 
Argentina 1900-2009 1876-2009 
Bolivia 1950-2009 -- 
Brazil 1980-2009 1861-2009 
Chile 1900-2009 1861-2009 
China -- 1982-2009 
Colombia 1923-2009 1906-2009 
Costa Rica 1950-2009 -- 
Egypt -- 1895-2009 
Ecuador 1939-2009 -- 
El Salvador 1939-2009 -- 
Ghana 1952-2009 -- 
India 1950-2009 1868-2009 
Indonesia 1972-2009 1911-2009 
Kenya 1963-2009 -- 
Korea -- 1913-2009 
Malaysia 1955-2009 1949-2009 
Mexico 1917-2009 1896-2009 
Nigeria 1990-2009 -- 
Peru 1917-2009 1897-2009 
Philippines 1950-2009 1948-2009 
Russia -- 1885-2009 
Singapore 1969-2009 1969-2009 
South Africa 1950-2009 1912-2009 
Sri Lanka 1950-2009 1871-2009 
Thailand 1950-2009 1987-2009 
Turkey 1933-2009 1875-2009 
Uruguay 1935-2009 1971-2009 
Venezuela 1921-2009 1914-2009 
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 Table A2. The nonlinear relation between lagged public debt and growth, 1790-2009, annual data  
EXOGENOUSLY IMPOSED DEBT THRESHOLDS (30%, 60%, 90% of government debt) 
 
ALL COUNTRIES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 16 EMERGING COUNTRIES 21 EMERGING COUNTRIES 
 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
1790- 
2009 
1790- 
1939 
1946- 
2009 
Nonlinear variable = lagged central government debt; Threshold variable = lagged central government debt  
Linear model -0.003  0.008 * -0.007 ** -0.006 ** 0.005  -0.013 ** 0.009 
 
0.026 * 0.010 
 
0.007 
 
0.020 * 0.004 
 2-regime model             
               debt<90% 0.005  0.031 ** -0.004  0.000  0.026 ** -0.016 ** 0.017 ** 0.046 ** 0.014 * 0.014 ** 0.042 ** 0.008 
     debt>=90% -0.003  0.011 ** -0.008 ** -0.005 * 0.009  -0.013 ** 0.006 
 
0.023 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.020 * 0.000 
 3-regime model             
                debt<=60% -0.003  0.018  -0.017 ** -0.001  0.018  -0.029 ** -0.004 
 
0.025 
 
0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
0.029 
 
0.000 
     60%<=debt <90% -0.005  0.014  -0.013 ** -0.007  0.011  -0.022 ** 0.002 
 
0.027 
 
0.005 
 
0.000 
 
0.025 
 
-0.001 
     debt>=90% -0.003  0.009 * -0.007 ** -0.005 * 0.006  -0.014 ** 0.010 
 
0.026 
 
0.013 * 0.007 
 
0.021 * 0.008 
 4-regime model             
                debt<30% -0.001  0.009  -0.016  0.024  0.039  -0.015  -0.027 
 
-0.028 
 
0.003 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.010 
     30%<=debt <60% -0.003  0.017  -0.017 ** 0.004  0.021  -0.026 ** -0.009 
 
0.013 
 
0.002 
 
-0.008 
 
0.018 
 
-0.002 
     60%<=debt <90% -0.005  0.013  -0.013 ** -0.003  0.013  -0.020 ** -0.002 
 
0.016 
 
0.005 
 
-0.003 
 
0.016 
 
-0.003 
     debt>=90% -0.003  0.009 * -0.007 * -0.003  0.007  -0.012 ** 0.007 
 
0.019 
 
0.013 
 
0.005 
 
0.016 
 
0.007 
 Nonlinear variable = lagged rate of growth of central government debt; Threshold variable = lagged central government debt  
Linear model -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
 
0.006 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.002 
 2-regime model             
               debt<90% -0.001  0.000  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
 
0.003 
 
-0.002 
     debt>=90% -0.005  0.006  -0.001  -0.030  -0.013  -0.026  0.014 
 
0.022 
 
0.005 
 
0.015 
 
0.022 
 
0.002 
 3-regime model             
                debt<=60% -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  0.000  -0.010  -0.001 
 
0.006 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.002 
     60%<=debt <90% -0.007  -0.011 * -0.002  -0.003  -0.006  -0.001  -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.018 
 
-0.016 ** -0.021 ** -0.009 
     debt>=90% 0.001  0.014  0.000  -0.031  -0.010  -0.082 ** 0.024 
 
0.038 
 
0.008 
 
0.023 
 
0.039 
 
0.005 
 4-regime model             
                debt<30% 0.000  0.000  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.000 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
     30%<=debt <60% -0.020 ** -0.011  -0.033 ** -0.018 * -0.014  -0.027 ** -0.018 
 
0.015 
 
-0.041 ** -0.020 ** -0.010 
 
-0.035 ** 
    60%<=debt <90% -0.007  -0.011 * -0.002  -0.003  -0.006  -0.001  -0.022 ** -0.023 ** -0.018 
 
-0.016 ** -0.021 ** -0.009 
     debt>=90% 0.001  0.014  -0.001  -0.031  -0.010  -0.082 ** 0.023 
 
0.039 
 
0.008 
 
0.023 
 
0.039 
 
0.004 
 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The estimations are carried out with country fixed effects.   
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Table A3. The nonlinear effect of public debt on growth, annual data 
DEBT THRESHOLDS DETERMINED ENDOGENOUSLY 
 1790-2009 1946-2009 
 
Nonlinear variable =public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = public debt/GDP 
Nonlinear variable = public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = public debt/GDP 
 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
21 emerging 
markets 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
21 emerging 
markets 
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 
 
0.002 
 
0.006 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
 H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.194 
 
0.022 
 
0.020 
 
0.104 
 
0.020 
 
0.104 
 Coefficients 
               Low debt 0.039 ** 0.069 ** -0.093 ** 0.037 * 0.005 
 
-0.082 ** 
   Middle debt 
  
0.017 
 
-0.053 ** 
  
-0.029 ** -0.035 ** 
   High debt -0.006 ** -0.002 
 
-0.027 ** -0.018 ** -0.018 ** 
  Debt thresholds (%) 
                Threshold 1 19.26 
 
20.40 
 
29.01 
 
17.48 
 
28.21 
 
32.97 
     Threshold 2 
  
40.68 
 
55.57 
   
 62.32 
   
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table A4. Sensitivity check, advanced OECD countries, 1946-2009, annual data, lagged public debt 
 
Nonlinear variable = lagged public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged public debt/GDP 
Nonlinear variable = lagged growth rate of public debt/GDP 
Threshold variable = lagged public debt/GDP 
 
Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 10% 5% 30% 10% 5% 
Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.258 
 
0.034 
 
0.022 
 H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.190 
 
0.118 
 
0.000 
 
0.018 
 
0.028 
 
0.012 
 Coefficients 
               Low debt 0.048 ** 0.063 ** 0.032 
   
0.017 
 
0.017 
    Middle debt 
    
-0.019 ** 
  
-0.023 ** -0.023 ** 
   High debt -0.008 ** -0.008 * -0.006 
   
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 Debt thresholds (%) 
               Threshold 1 22.37 
 
20.38 
 
20.38 
   
13.64 
 
13.64 
    Threshold 2 
    
106.33 
   
60.82 
 
60.82 
 
Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5. Advanced OECD countries, 1946-2009, non-overlapping multi-year averages, sensitivity check 
 Minimum % of observations required in one regime 
 30% 10% 5% 
Nonlinear variable = level of the public debt to GDP ratio 
Threshold variable= public debt to GDP ratio 
 5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 
5-year  8-year  10-year  5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.002 
 
0.048 
 
0.010 
 
0.002  0.024  0.004  0.002 
 
0.020 
 
0.008 
 H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.246 
 
0.252 
 
0.006 
 
0.002  0.004  0.002  0.004 
 
0.008 
 
0.006 
 Coefficients 
      
      
         Low debt 0.032 * 0.028 
 
-0.003 
 
0.186 ** 0.226 ** 0.189 ** 0.186 ** 0.226 ** 0.189 ** 
   Middle debt 
  
-0.009 
 
-0.04 ** 0.046 ** 0.047 ** 0.041 * 0.046 ** 0.047 ** 0.041 * 
   High debt -0.01 * 
  
-0.022 ** -0.004  -0.003  -0.009  -0.004 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.009 
 Debt thresholds (%) 
      
      
         Threshold 1 32.47 
 
31.56 
 
36.30 
 
12.51  11.98  12.30  12.51 
 
11.98 
 
12.30 
    Threshold 2 
    
54.53 
 
33.27  31.56  36.30  33.27 
 
31.56 
 
36.30 
 Nonlinear variable = rate of growth of the public debt to GDP ratio 
Threshold variable= public debt to GDP ratio 
 5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 
5-year  8-year  10-year  5-year 
 
8-year 
 
10-year 
 Test of nonlinearity Bootstrapped p-value 
H0: linear vs. H1: 2-regimes 0.022 
 
0.034 
 
0.018 
 
0.022  0.016  0.020  0.044 
 
0.024 
 
0.010 
 H0: 2-regimes vs. H1: 3-regimes 0.282 
 
0.374 
 
0.210 
 
0.088  0.100  0.074  0.090 
 
0.088 
 
0.096 
 Coefficients 
      
      
         Low debt -0.009 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.037 
 
0.018  -0.005  -0.018  0.018 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.018 
    Middle debt 
      
-0.064 **   -0.099 ** -0.064 ** -0.149 ** -0.099 ** 
   High debt -0.078 ** -0.095 ** -0.151 ** -0.008  -0.095 ** -0.298 ** -0.008 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.298 ** 
Debt thresholds (%) 
      
      
         Threshold 1 52.62 
 
42.56 
 
26.08 
 
17.47  42.56  15.36  17.47 
 
42.56 
 
15.36 
    Threshold 2 
      
39.13    67.04  39.13 
 
61.98 
 
67.04 
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Figure A1. Annual real GDP growth and lagged central government debt as a % of GDP 
Panel A. All countries 
    1790-2009       1790-1939       1946-2009 
 
Panel B. Developed economies 
    1790-2009       1790-1939       1946-2009 
 
Panel C. 21 emerging market economies 
    1790-2009       1790-1939       1946-2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Figure A2. Non-overlapping multi-year real GDP growth and lagged central government debt as a % of GDP, 1946-2009 
Panel A. Developed and emerging market economies 
    5-year averages      8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Panel B. Developed economies 
    5-year averages      8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Panel C. 21 emerging market economies 
    5-year averages      8-year averages      10-year averages 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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